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FIREFIGHTERS LOCAL UNION No. 1984 V. STOTTS: ARE
SENIORITY SYSTEMS APPROACHING INVIOLABILITY IN
TITLE VII ACTIONS?
INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 was enacted to eliminate
all forms of discrimination in the workplace. 2 Specifically, it prohibits
discrimination based on race, color, sex, and national origin with respect
to compensation, terms, and conditions of employment. 3 The impor-
tance of hiring and promoting employees in a manner free from the ra-
cially and sexually discriminatory practices of the past cannot be
contested.
Equally important in the workplace, however, are seniority sys-
tems.4 Seniority provisions often govern such vital issues as the em-
ployee's eligibility for promotion, the length of his vacation, and the
likelihood that he will be laid off. Seniority, in short, may be the primary
collective bargaining factor affecting a worker's security.
5
In many instances, the seniority expectations of workers directly
collide with the anti-discrimination provisions of Title VII. Layoffs by
seniority may completely erase the progress made in previous years by
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-l-2000e-17 (1982).
2. See generally Vaas, Title VII. Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 431
(1966). ("[Flaced with 'a rising tide of discontent that threaten[ed] public safety' and 'the
events in Birmingham and elsewhere,' President Kennedy on June 19, 1963,. . . [stressed
before Congress] that the relief of Negro unemployment required progress in three major
areas, namely, creating more jobs . . .raising the level of skills through more education
and training and eliminating racial discrimination in employment." Id. at 432 (quoting
109 CONG. REC. 1174 (1963), after twelve months of debate, the Eighty-eighth Congress
translated this sentiment into law. Id. at 433-58).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982). Section 703(a) provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982).
4. The Supreme Court has defined a "seniority system" as:
[A] scheme that, alone or in tandem with non-"seniority" criteria, allots to em-
ployees ever improving employment rights and benefits as their relative lengths
of pertinent employment increase. . . . [T]he principle feature of any and every
"seniority system" is that preferential treatment is dispensed on the basis of some
measure of time served in employment.
California Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598, 605-06 (1980).
5. See Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature and Enforceability of Seniority Rights, 75 HARV.
L. REV. 1532, 1534 (1962). See also Wines, Seniority, Recession, and Affirmative Action: The
Challenge For Collective Bargaining, 20 AM. Bus. L.J. 37, 43 (1982) (suggesting that seniority
rights may be second only to wages in importance to labor organization members).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
affirmative action hiring.6 Awarding a discrimination victim retroactive
seniority7 may disrupt the existing seniority hierarchy and affect the sen-
iority rights of one or more incumbent employees.8 Since the inception
of Title VII, the judicial system has struggled with the competing inter-
ests of seniority rights and the anti-discrimination goals of Title VII.
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts9 presents new issues in the con-
flict; it also relies on prior judicial interpretations of sections 703(h)' 0
and 7 06(g)" of Title VII, both of which specifically affect seniority
systems.
This article will discuss the significant Supreme Court and lower
federal court rulings on sections 703(h) and 70 6 (g) of Title VII. Then it
will examine the appellate and Supreme Court Stotts opinions, giving
particular attention to the opinions' consistency with precedent. Finally,
potential ramifications of Stotts on the ongoing tension between seniority
rights and successful affirmative action policies will be considered.
6. Wines, supra note 5, at 45.
7. Retroactive or constructive seniority, such as job offers and retroactive backpay, is
a remedy applied by the courts to place the discrimination victim in the employment posi-
tion in which he would have been were it not for the act of discrimination. It is calculated
from the date of the discriminatory act. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S.
747, 765-66 (1976) (calculating the retroactive seniority award from the date of the plain-
tiff's application for employment, where the discriminatory act was the refusal to employ
the plaintiff on the basis of race); Acha v. Beame, 531 F.2d 648, 655-56 (2d Cir. 1976)
(instructing district court to award retroactive seniority to female police officers from the
date they would have been hired, provided that the women could show they had been
refused employment based on sex).
8. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); see infra notes 83-95
and accompanying text.
9. 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984).
10. Section 703(h) states in relevant part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlaw-
ful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compen-
sation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a
bona fide seniority or merit system, . . . provided that such differences are not
the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982).
11. Section 7 0 6 (g) provides:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intention-
ally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the
court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment
practice, and order such affirmative 'action as may be appropriate, which may in-
clude, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without
back pay (payable by the employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as
the case may be, responsible for the unlawful employment practice), or any other
equitable relief as the court deems appropriate. Back pay liability shall not accrue from a
date more than two years prior to the filing of a charge with the Commission.
Interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or
persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise al-
lowable. No order of the court shall require the admission or reinstatement of an
individual as a member of a union, or the hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of
an individual as an employee, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such
individual was refused admission, suspended, or expelled, or was refused employ-
ment or advancement or was suspended or discharged for any reason other than
discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin or in
violation of section 2000e-3(a) of this title.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982) (emphasis added).
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I. SECTION 703(h)-PROTECTING BONA FIDE SENIORITY SYSTEMS
A. Timing and Intent
Section 703(h) immunizes "bona fide" seniority systems from the
operation of Title VII. 12 Congress wrote the section in response to its
concern about the impact of Title VII on employees' seniority rights.
13
Senator Clark, during the course of the Senate debate on Title VII, sub-
mitted a memorandum from the Justice Department which said:
[I]t has been asserted that Title VII would undermine vested
rights of seniority. This is not correct. Title VII would have no
effect on seniority rights existing at the time it takes effect. If,
for example, a collective bargaining contract provides that in
the event of layoffs, those who were hired last must be laid off
first, such a provision would not be affected in the least by title
VII. . . . It is perfectly clear that when a worker is laid off or
denied a chance for promotion because under established sen-
iority rules he is 'low man on the totem pole' he is not being
discriminated against because of his race.
14
The legislative history of section 703(h) clearly indicates that the section
was meant to protect seniority rights extant at the time of the enactment
of Title VII. 15 Whether Congress intended that section 703(h) protect
12. The problem of defining the elements of a bona fide seniority system is closely
related to the issue of the conflict between seniority systems and Title VII goals. The
Supreme Court has not clearly defined what constitutes a bona fide seniority system. See
Kasold, Toward Definition of the Bona Fide Seniority System, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 41, 41 (1983).
One commentator, however, has suggested that the Court's sole criteria for determining
whether a seniority system is bona fide is if a discriminatory intent underlies the discrimi-
natory effects produced or propagated by the system. "These apparently alternative de-
terminations are one in the same." Id. at 48. See infra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
Some Supreme Court opinions, however, treat the intent issue as being separate from
the question of what constitutes a bona fide seniority system. See, e.g., United Airlines v.
Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 559-60 (1977) (suggesting that a bona fide seniority system can cause
a disparate effect upon minorities as a result of intentional discrimination). This article
will follow Stotts, which similarly treats intent and the bona fides of a seniority system as
separate elements in a Title VII claim:
Section 703(h) of Title VII provides that it is not an unlawful employment prac-
tice to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment purusant to a bone fide seniority system, provided
that such differences are as to the result of an intention to discriminate ....
Stotts, 104 S. Ct. at 2587.
13. See H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 71-72 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 2391, 2439-41.
14. 110 CONG. REC. 7202 (1964). But see Senator Humphrey's remarks:
[§ 703(h)] has been added, providing that it is not an unlawful employment prac-
tice for an employer to maintain different terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment either in different locations or pursuant to a seniority, merit, or other
incentive system, provided the differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate on
grounds of race, religion, or national origin. For example, if an employer has two
plants in different locations, and one of the plants employs substantially more
Negroes than the other, it is not unlawful discrimination if the pay, conditions, or
facilities are better at one plant than at the other unless it is shown that the employer
was intending to discriminate for or against one of the racial groups.
Bureau of National Affairs Operations Manual, The Civil Rights Act of 1964 at 302, quoted
in Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc. 279 F. Supp. 505, 517 (E.D. Va. 1968) (emphasis added).
15. See generally Note, Expanding Title VII's Exemption for Seniority Rights: American To-
bacco Company v. Patterson, 25 B.C.L. REV. 44, 48-50 (1983) (referring to the congres-
sional debate preceding the enactment of Title VII as an indication that § 703(h) was
1985]
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seniority systems created after Title VII's effective date is less clear.' 6
Consequently, questions arose concerning whether the immunity af-
forded seniority systems by section 703(h) was to be prospective as well
as retroactive from Title VII's effective date. In addition, the issue arose
as to whether the employer's intent to discriminate was to be an element
of proof of Title VII violations. 7 These two issues of timing and intent
have been the main foci of judicial interpretation of section 703(h).
B. Juticial Interpretations of Section 703(h)
1. 'Present Effects of Past Discrimination
The earliest significant decision interpreting section 703(h) was a
district court case, Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc. 18 Prior to the effective
date of Title VII, the defendant company had formally segregated its
employees into black and white departments.' 9 The white departments
-were generally better paying and more desirable. The company ceased
the discriminatory hiring policy on January 1, 1966, six months after
Title VII became effective. The department system was then facially
neutral. 20 Because the company's collective bargaining agreement in-
cluded a departmental seniority system, 2 1 when a black employee at-
tempted to transfer to one of the formerly white departments he was
forced to surrender his accrued seniority. 2 2 The plaintiffs argued that
Quarles and other blacks hired beforeJanuary 1, 1966, were deprived of
advancement opportunities due to the present effects of the company's
intentionally discriminatory hiring policy of the past.23 Philip Morris
argued that section 703(h), protected their seniority system. 24
The court rejected Philip Morris's argument, ruling that the senior-
ity system was not "bona fide."'2 5 The court stated that "[o]bviously one
characteristic of a 'bona fide' seniority system must be a lack of discrimi-
nation. Nothing in section 703(h), or in its legislative history, suggests
that a racially discriminatory seniority system established before the act
is a bonafide seniority system under the act."'2 6 Significantly, Quarles indi-
cated that a Title VII plaintiff was not required to demonstrate a present
discriminatory intent on the part of his employer to be successful. Plain-
tiff only needed to show that a past intent to discriminate had a present
included to appease the concerns voiced by opponents that Title VII would destroy ex-
isting seniority rights).
16. The Supreme Court eventually ruled that post-Act seniority systems did fall within
the protection of § 703(h). See infra note 58 and accompanying text discussing American
Tobacco Co. v. Patterson.
17. See infra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
18. 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
19. Id. at 508.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 513.
22. Id. at 513-14.
23. id. at 514.
24. Id. at 515.
25. Id. at 517.
26. Id.
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discriminatory effect. 2 7
The Supreme Court again addressed the conflict between the valid-
ity of the seniority systems and intentional pre-Act discrimination in In-
ternational Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States.2 8 In Teamsters, the
United States brought a Title VII action against T. I. M. E.-D. C., Inc., a
nationwide carrier of motor freight, and its union, which represented a
large portion of T. I. M. E.-D. C.'s employees. 29 The dispute in Team-
sters focused on the difference in racial and ethnic composition between
two types of drivers employed by T. I. M. E.-D. C. The T. I. M. E.-D. C.
drivers were employed either as local city drivers or as line-drivers. The
local drivers and service positions were lower paying and less desirable
positions3 0 than the line-driver positions, which called for long distance
truck driving.s ' The line-drivers comprised a separate bargaining unit.
The government3 2 claimed that the line positions were given over-
whelmingly to whites, that blacks and spanish-surnamed persons worked
exclusively as local drivers,3 3 and that the Teamsters and T. I. M. E.-D.
C. had engaged in a system-wide practice of discrimination in violation
of Title VII.3 4 The government further alleged that the seniority system
in the collective bargaining agreement between the union and the em-
ployer violated Title VII by perpetuating the effects of past racial and
ethnic discrimination.
3 5
The defendant union argued that the intent of section 703(h) was to
ensure that the mere perpetuation of pre-Act discrimination was not vio-
lative of the Act.3 6 The union said that because it was not guilty of any
post-Act discrimination, it had not violated Title VII.3 7 Conversely, the
government took the position that no seniority system perpetuating dis-
crimination before or after the Act can be deemed bona fide.
3 8
After finding that T. I. M. E.-D. C. had engaged in discriminatory
hiring practices,3 9 the Court considered whether the seniority system
27. Id. at 517-19.
28. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
29. Id. at 328.
30. Id. at 329.
31. Id. at 330 n.3.
32. At the time the Teamsters action was instituted, under § 707 the U.S. Attorney
General was responsible for bringing Title VII actions involving patterns or prac-
tices of employment discrimination. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972 amended § 707 and gave the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) the authority to bring "pattern or practice" suits against private-sector
employers.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(c) (1982).
33. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 329.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 328.
36. Id. at 345.
37. Id. at 345-46. The Court did not fully discuss the issue of post-Act discrimination.
The union argued, and the Court implicitly agreed, that there was no post-Act discrimina-
tion in Teamsters because the union had agreed to represent post-Act victims in grievance
proceedings. Id. at 345-47 and n.28.
38. Id. at 346.
39. The Court upheld the lower courts' findings that T. I. M. E-D. C. had engaged in a
racially premised pattern or practice in recruiting, hiring and promoting minority group
1985]
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contained in the collective bargaining agreement violated Title VII. 40
Under the collective bargaining agreement, employee benefits such as
vacations and pensions were tied to the particular employee's seniority
regardless of the employee's job or bargaining unit. However, matters
such as the order in which the employees bid for particular jobs, and the
order of layoffs and recalls from layoffs were determined by the length
of time spent in a particular bargaining unit.4 l Hence, the structure of
the collective bargaining agreement created a disincentive for the ser-
vicemen and the local drivers to apply for a line-driver position because
a transfer out of the local drivers' bargaining unit would result in a com-
plete loss of seniority. The Court explained that "[t]he practical effect is
that a city driver or serviceman who transfers to a line-driver job must
forfeit all the competitive seniority he had accumulated in his previous
bargaining unit and start at the bottom of the line drivers' 'board.' "42
The Court therefore agreed that the seniority system perpetuated
the effects of pre-Act discrimination. 4 3 The issue before the Court then
was whether section 703(h) validated "otherwise bona fide seniority sys-
tems that afford no constructive seniority to victims discriminated
against prior to the effective date of Title VII . . . . 44 After careful
consideration of the legislative history of Title VII, the Court concluded
that "routine application of a bona fide seniority system would not be
unlawful under Title VII. . . . even where the employer's pre-Act dis-
crimination resulted in whites having greater existing seniority rights
than Negroes." '4 5 The Court rejected the government's contention that
a neutral seniority system that perpetuates the effects of pre-Act discrim-
ination could not be "bona fide" within the meaning of section 703(h),
thereby overruling Quar/es.4
6
Teamsters did not comment directly on the intent issue. It did, how-
ever, specifically proscribe the use of the disparate impact test set forth
in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.4 7 Under Griggs, a hiring or promotion system
members. 431 U.S. at 337. Based on statistical and testimonial evidence, the Court con-
cluded that the government sustained its burden of showing a prima facie case of unlawful
discrimination. d. at 337-43. The Court stated that the government met its burden of
proving by a preponderance of evidence that "racial discrimination was the company's
standard operating procedure." Id. at 336-37.
40. Id. at 343-56.
41. Id. at 343.
42. Id. at 344.
43. Id. at 345-47.
44. Id. at 348.
45. Id. at 352.
46. The Court held that "an otherwise neutral, legitimate seniority system does not
become unlawful under Title VII simply because it may perpetuate pre-Act discrimina-
tion." Id. at 353-54. The Court in Teamsters suggested that a seniority system is bona fide
if it "applies equally to all races and ethnic groups." Id. at 355-56.
47. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The Supreme Court held that an employer could not use
facially neutral intelligence and comprehension tests or require a high school education as
a prerequisite to hiring job applicants because the requirements discriminated against
blacks and were unrelated to job performance. Id. at 427-30. The suit was filed in North
Carolina. Due largely to a segregated public school system, almost three times as many
white males as black males graduated from high school in that state, and 58% of the whites
taking the employer's test passed, while only 6% of the blacks passed. Id. at 430 & n.6.
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which is facially neutral and has no discriminatory intent violates Title
VII if it has a discriminatory effect. 48 The Teamsters court distinguished
Griggs because Griggs did not challenge a seniority system, and section
703(h) specifically protects bona fide seniority systems.4 9 Teamsters thus
approves seniority systems that do not facially discriminate against racial
or ethnic groups.50 By ruling out the Griggs "effects" test, the Court
effectively imposed an "intent" test. Later, in American Tobacco Co. v. Pat-
terson,5 1 the Court clarified its test by specifically requiring plaintiffs
challenging a seniority system to show "actual intent" to discriminate.
52
As Justice Marshall observed in a strong dissent, Teamsters signified a
major change in judicial interpretation of section 703(h) and treatment
of seniority systems. 53 He correctly anticipated that the new intent re-
quirement tacitly suggested by the majority for invalidating a discrimina-
tory pre-Act seniority system could easily be extended to post-Act
systems, 54 thereby further weakening the effectiveness of Title VII in
combating discrimination. Furthermore, requiring proof of intent im-
poses a heavy burden on the Title VII claimant. As one court observed:
"Seldom does a party intent on practicing discrimination declare or an-
nounce his purpose. It is more likely that methods subtle and elusive
are used to accomplish the desired discrimination."-5 5 Justice Marshall
wrote that the effect of the decision was to "write off an entire genera-
tion of minority group employees."
5 6
2. Post-Act Protection and Present Intent
In 1982, the Court fully extended the protection afforded to senior-
ity systems by section 703(h) to include seniority systems implemented
The Court wrote that "[Congress has] provided that the vessel in which the milk is prof-
fered must be one all seekers can use." Id. at 431. The Court also stated:
Under [Title VII], practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even
neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to "freeze" the
status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices . . . The Act proscribes
not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discrimi-
natory in operation . . . . Good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does
not redeem employment procedures [that are discriminatory in effect] . . . Con-
gress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment practices,
not simply the motivation.
Id. at 430-32 (emphasis in original).
This rationale came to be known as the "disparate impact" concept of discrimination,
and remains the standard by which employment practices are measured for possible Title
VII violations in cases not involving seniority systems protected by § 703(h). See, e.g.,
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (reaffirming the viability of the Griggs disparate
impact analysis in gender cases).
48. Id. at 430, cited in Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 349.
49. 431 U.S. at 349-53.
50. Id. at 355.
51. 456 U.S. 63 (1982). See infra notes 58-66.
52. 456 U.S. at 65.
53. 431 U.S. at 337-94 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 383 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
55. Rachlin, Title VII Limitations and Qualifications, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 473,
480 (1966) (quoting Marano Constr. Co. v. New York State Comm'n for Human Rights, 45
Misc. 2d 1081, 1085, 259 N.Y.S.2d 4, 9 (1965)).
56. 431 U.S. at 388 (Marshall.J.. dissenting).
19851
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
after the effective date of Title VII. 5 7 In American Tobacco Co. v. Patter-
son,5 8 discrimination victims argued that the protections afforded em-
ployers under section 703(h) applied only to bona fide systems which
were in existence before the effective date of Title VII. If this were true,
then employers would be liable when any post-Act seniority system had
a "disparate impact" on groups covered under Title VII. 59 The Court
rejected the employees' argument and held that section 703(h) applied
to seniority systems adopted after the effective date of the Civil Rights
Act as well as those adopted before the effective date.
60
The Court closely analyzed the legislative history of section 703(h)
and concluded there was no clear indication that Congress intended to
distinguish between pre-Act and post-Act seniority systems. 6 1 The
Court relied on interpretive memoranda prepared by the Justice Depart-
ment and various senators during legislative deliberations on Title VII
stating that Title VII would have no effect on established seniority
rights.6 2 Relying on Teamsters6 3 and United Airlines v. Evans,6 4 the Court
held that section 703(h) makes no distinction between seniority systems
adopted before the effective date and those adopted after the effective
date. The Court stated:
In Teamsters v. United States. .. we held that section 703(h) ex-
empts from Title VII the disparate impact of a bona fide senior-
ity system even if the differential treatment is the result of pre-
Act racially discriminatory employment practices. Similarly,
. .[in Evans] the Court interpreted section 703(h) to immu-
nize seniority systems which perpetuate post-Act discrimina-
tion. Thus, taken together, Teamsters and Evans stand for the
proposition . . . that section 703(h) on its face immunizes all
bona fide seniority systems .... 65
On the issue of intent the American Tobacco Court clearly stated:
"Under section 703(h), the fact that a seniority system has a discrimina-
tory impact is not alone sufficient to invalidate the system; actual intent
57. Title VII became effective on July 2, 1965. The Court first indicated its willing-
ness to extend its protection to post-Act seniority systems in Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 348
n.30.
58. 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982).
59. See supra note 47.
60. 456 U.S. at 76.
61. Id. at 71-75.
62. Id. at 73-75. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
63. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
64. 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
65. 456 U.S. at 75 (quoting Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 348 n.30).
The American Tobacco Court incorrectly attributes the Evans decision with having im-
munized seniority systems perpetuating post-Act discrimination. In fact, Evans involved a
Title VII claim which was rejected by the Court because it was filed late. 431 U.S. at 555.
The Evans Court said, "A discriminatory act which is not made the basis for a timely
charge is the legal equivalent of a discriminatory act which occurred before [Title VII] was
passed." Id. at 558 (emphasis added). The Court rejected the claim, not to protect the
seniority system, but because the petitioner did not file her claim in time. The Evans Court
held that "[t]he statute does not foreclose attacks on the current operation of seniority
systems which are subject to challenge as discriminatory." Id. at 560.
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to discriminate must be proved."' 6 6 The same year, in Pullman-Standard
v. Swint,6 7 the Court re-affirmed that, absent discriminatory intent, a
seniority system perpetuating pre-Act discrimination does not violate
Title VII. 68 Furthermore, the opinion offers helpful guidance to the Ti-
tle VII claimant regarding the proof of discriminatory intent. The Court
tacitly approved the four-prong test first articulated by the Fifth Circuit
in James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co.69 According to the Fifth Circuit,
a court should focus on four factors when determining discriminatory
intent. First, a court must consider whether the seniority system "oper-
ates to discourage all employees equally from transferring between sen-
iority units." 70 More generally, the court must decide whether a system
applies equally and uniformly to all employees. 7 1 "Second, a court must
examine the rationality of departmental structure, upon which the sen-
iority system relies, in light of the general industry practice." 72 Third, a
court must consider "whether the system had its genesis in racial dis-
crimination." 7 3 Fourth, it must consider " 'whether the system was ne-
gotiated and has been maintained free from any illegal purpose.' -74
Hence, although a showing of intent is a prerequisite for establishing an
unlawful seniority system under Title VII, intent can be inferred from
the existence of certain conditions.
7 5
66. Id. at 65. Two additional Supreme Court opinions clearly emphasizing the intent
requirement are United Airlines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977) ("[Section 703(h)] ex-
pressly provides that it shall not be an unlawful employment practice to apply different
terms of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority system, provided that any disparity
is not the result of intentional discrimination.") id. at 559-60 and Trans World Airlines v.
Henderson, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) ("[A]bsent a discriminatory purpose, the operation of a
seniority system cannot be an unlawful employment practice even if the system has some
discriminatory consequences.") Id. at 82.
67. 456 U.S. 273 (1982).
68. Id. at 277 (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 83 (1977)).
69. 559 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978). The origins of the
four prong test can be found in Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 355-56.
70. Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 279 (quotingJames, 559 F.2d at 352).
71. 456 U.S. at 279.
72. Id. at 280 (citingJames, 559 F.2d at 352).
73. 456 U.S. at 281 (quotingJames, 559 F.2d at 352).
74. Id.
75. The four prong test approved of in Pullman-Standard arose in the context of a class
action. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the Court listed four
factors which an individual complainant should show in order to successfully establish a
prima facie case of racially discriminatory hiring practices. McDonell did not involve a chal-
lenge to a seniority system. The proof-of-intent analysis, however, could be applied to
seniority system cases. The four factors are:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a
job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifica-
tions, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained
open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complain-
ant's qualifications.
Id. at 802. Once these factors have been established, the burden shifts to the employer or
union to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for denying employment
opportunities.
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II. JUDICIAL REMEDIES UNDER TITLE VII: APPLICATION
OF SECTION 706(g)
A. Remedies Generally
Once a court has determined that an employer has engaged in dis-
crimination demanding judicial relief, it must determine the scope of
relief. The court may follow one of two courses. The scope of relief is
directly related to the definition of the membership of the affected mi-
nority group. In class actions, the court may choose to follow a restric-
tive path and limit the membership of the class to the victims who were
qualified for starting or transfer positions, applied for the positions but
were excluded because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
76
Alternatively, the court may apply a more expansive remedy and award
relief to all potentially qualified applicants of the aggrieved group in the
geographic area from which the employer selects employees, provided
these persons can establish that they would have applied for the job had it
not been for the discriminatory practice.
77
In addition to deciding who is entitled to relief, the court must de-
cide on the particular type of remedy. The court may provide compen-
satory relief in an attempt to make the victim whole for the losses
suffered. In fashioning a compensatory decree, courts have awarded vic-
tims: the job, training, seniority, or back pay they would have received
had it not been for the employer's discrimination. 78 Courts may also
order injunctions to prevent further discrimination. 79 Courts have en-
joined employers from continuing the seniority systems or work alloca-
tion systems which unlawfully discriminate. Injunctive relief is the
"minimum" amount of relief required in any proven case.80 Courts
have also ordered a governmental employer to hire a designated
number of employees from minority groups in order to cure the effect of
prior discrimination. 8 1
B. Judicial Interpretations of Section 706(g)
The statutory authority forjudicial relief from violations of Title VII
is section 706(g). 8 2 Retroactive seniority is not specifically included
among the remedies suggested by the statute. Courts, however, are per-
mitted to award "other equitable relief" as appropriate. Three impor-
tant Supreme Court cases have ruled on whether retroactive seniority is
an appropriate form of equitable relief under section 7 06(g). The first
76. See Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A General Ap-
proach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1634 (1969).
77. See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
78. See, e.g., Cooper & Sobol, supra note 76, at 1632.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1633.
81. See, e.g., United States v. United Papermakers and Paperworkers Local 189, 282 F.
Supp. 39 (E.D. La. 1968) (paper mill and paper workers union ordered to establish non-
discriminatory seniority system).
82. See supra note 11.
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of those is Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co. 8 3
Franks involved a class action brought against the employer and the
union. The complaint charged, and the district court agreed, that the
employer had engaged in racially discriminatory hiring practices. 8 4 The
discrimination victims, applicants who had been denied jobs, did not at-
tack the seniority system itself. Once successful in proving their discrim-
ination charges, however, they sought an award of seniority status
comparable to the status they would have enjoyed had it not been for
the discrimination. 8 5 The Franks court was therefore presented with the
issue of whether retroactive seniority is an appropriate remedy under
section 706(g) to compensate the victims of a discriminatory hiring
practice.
8 6
To answer this question, the Court considered the congressional
intent in enacting Title VII and concluded that Congress intended that
broad relief be available to the discriminatee. The Court stated that
"one of the central purposes of Title VII is 'to make persons whole for
injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination.'
To effectuate this 'make whole' objective, Congress in [section] 706(g)
vested broad equitable discretion in the federal courts .... 87 After
examining the remedial approach taken by the National Labor Relations
Board, 88 the Court concluded that retroactive seniority awards are ordi-
narily necessary to achieve the "make-whole" purposes of the Act. By
"slotting the victim in that position in the seniority system that would
have been his had he been hired at the time of his application" for the
job in question,8 9 the victim will be restored to his "rightful place." 90
Justice Powell, in the dissent, wrote that retroactive seniority would
83. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
84. Id. at 750-51.
85. Id. at 758.
86. Id. at 750.
87. Id. at 763 (citations omitted) (quoting Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
405, 418 (1975)). Albermarle was a Title VII class action in which the defendant had imple-
mented a discriminatory seniority system. The plaintiffs demanded backpay as a part of
their remedy. The Supreme Court ruled that although the award of backpay under Title
VII was a matter for the discretion of the district court, a determination that an employer's
breach of Title VII was not in bad faith was not a sufficient reason to deny backpay. 422
U.S. at 422-25.
88. The Court observed that section 7 06(g) was modeled after the National Labor
Relations Act, section 10(C), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982). Decisions construing section
10(C) of the NLRA specified that affirmative action awards include awards of seniority
status because the purpose of affirmative action awards is to redress "the wrong incurred
by an unfair labor practice . . . and to 'make the employees whole and thus restor[e] the
economic status quo that would have obtained but for the company's wrongful [act].' "
424 U.S. at 769 (quoting NLRB v. J.H. Ruter-Rex Mfg. Co., 396 U.S. 258, 236 (1969)).
The Court depended on the National Labor Relations Board's practice of requiring that
applicants who have been discriminatorily denied employment be given an award of sen-
iority equivalent to that which they would have enjoyed but for the illegal conduct. The
Court, however, made it clear that it was not necessarily authorizing a relief of seniority
status in all circumstances. Id. at 770. The trial court must view the facts and circum-
stances of the case "to allow the most complete achievement of the objectives of Title
VII." Id. at 770-71.
89. 424 U.S. at 765-66.
90. Id. at 764 n.21.
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be inappropriate because such grants would conflict with the economic
interests of "innocent employees." 9 1 He argued that an award of com-
petitive seniority serves not as a sanction against the employer but
rather as a sanction against innocent workers who bear the risk of losing
their jobs entirely.
92
The Franks majority rejected this argument by stating that the bur-
den of past discrimination should be shared by innocent employees as
well as the employer. 93 The Court was not, however, requiring a com-
plete dismantling of the seniority hierarchy but merely the placement of
the identified victims in their "rightful place."'94 The Franks ruling is
significant for two reasons. It provides the identified victim with the
remedy of retroactive seniority, and it indicates that the Supreme Court
was still concerned with the seniority rights of existing, "innocent"
employees.
95
The Teamsters case, discussed earlier with respect to the intent re-
quirement to invalidate bona fide seniority systems,9 6 is also important
for its discussion on the use of seniority as a remedy. In Teamsters the
Court addressed for the first time the question of whether those who
failed to apply for a job during the period of discrimination are entitled
to relief. The Court held that "an incumbent employee's failure to ap-
ply for a job is not an inexorable bar to an award of retroactive senior-
ity," 9 7 thereby rejecting the company's claim that only persons who had
actually applied and were rejected could be considered for a grant of
retroactive seniority.
98
The Court based its decision to grant relief to non-applicants on
several different factors. First, the Court reasoned that "a primary ob-
jective of Title VII is prophylactic: to achieve equal employment oppor-
tunity and to remove the barriers that have operated to favor white male
employees over other employees." 9 9 Furthermore, courts are author-
ized to exercise broad powers in granting the most appropriate relief
possible. l0 0 Second, the Court reasoned that potential applicants who
are aware of the employer's discriminatory practice would be disinclined
to apply for the jobs.10 ' The Court stated: "A consistently enforced
discriminatory policy can surely deter job applications from those who
are aware of it and are unwilling to subject themselves to the humiliation
91. Id. at 788 (Powell, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 789.
93. Id. at 777.
94. Id. at 764 n.21, 776-77.
95. With respect to § 703(h), the Franks court held that the legislative history revealed
that Congress did not intend to change seniority rights existing before the effective date of
the Act. 424 U.S. at 758-61. The Court, however, concluded that 703(h) did not bar an
award of seniority relief to unhired job applicants for post-Act discrimination. Id. at 761-
62.
96. See supra notes 28-56 and accompanying text.
97. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 364.
98. Id. at 363.
99. Id. at 364 (citations omitted).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 365-66.
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of explicit and certain rejection." 10 2 Hence, the Court refused to create
a per se rule barring non-applicants from recovering relief from an em-
ployer who has violated Title VII.
0 3
The Court did not, however, abandon the requirement that the Ti-
tle VII claimant prove himself to be an actual victim of discrimination, as
set forth in Franks.10 4 The Court placed a difficult burden of proof on
the non-applicant to establish that he was in fact interested in the posi-
tion. The mere fact that a pattern or practice of discrimination has been
shown is not enough to satisfy the burden. The non-applicant must
show that he would have applied for the job had it not been for his pro-
spective employer's discriminatory practices, 10 5 and that he possessed
the requisite qualifications. 10 6 The Court emphasized that "each spe-
cific individual" must prove his status as a discrimination victim to be
awarded relief. 10 7 Together Franks and Teamsters indicate the victim-spe-
cific remedial approach taken by the Court.
A third important Supreme Court decision involving the use of sen-
iority as a remedy was Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC.10 8 This opinion is consis-
tent with the victim-specific remedial focus of Franks and Teamsters, and,
perhaps more significantly, it restricts the judiciary's power to interfere
with existing seniority rights in devising a remedy under section 706(g).
Ford involved the issue of what action an employer charged with discrim-
ination must take to toll the accrual of backpay liability. 10 9 Previous
cases had held that an employer was liable for backpay to the successful
Title VII claimant for the period of time between the date the employee
was discriminatorily discharged and the date the employer made an un-
conditional offer to reinstate the claimant in his former, or substantially
equivalent, position. ''0 Ford raised the previously unaddressed issue of
whether the unconditional offer must also include seniority retroactive
to the date of the alleged discrimination. I"'
In 1971, three women, including the eventual Title VII claimants
involved in Ford, applied to Ford Motor Company for employment and
were rejected."12 The women filed a claim with the EEOC charging
102. Id. at 365.
103. Id. at 367.
104. 424 U.S. at 765-66.
105. 431 U.S. at 368.
106. Id. at 369 & n.53.
107. Id. at 371.
108. 458 U.S. 219 (1982).
109. Id. at 221.
110. See, e.g., Polynesian Cultural Center, Inc. v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1978);
NLRB v. Midwest Hanger Co., 550 F.2d 1101 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 830 (1977);
NLRB v. Huntington Hosp., Inc., 550 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1977).
111. 458 U.S. at 221. Nor had the issue been addressed by the N.L.R.B. In unfair
labor practice cases, however, the N.L.R.B. and lower federal courts had approved the
tolling of backpay liability without an offer of retroactive seniority. See Peterson & Lynch,
Limiting Employer Back-Pay Liability in Employment Discrimination Cases: Ford Motor Co. v.
EEOC, 9 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 276, 277 (1983). The Ford Court emphasized, moreover, the
analogous relationship between § 7 06(g) and the National Labor Relations Act, § 10(C),
29 U.S.C. § 160(C), as it decided the case. 458 U.S. at 226 n.8.
112. 458 U.S. at 221-22.
1985]
516 DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 62:2
Ford with sex discrimination. Two years later, Ford offered a warehouse
job to one of the claimants but without seniority retroactive to the date
of her 1971 application. The offer was declined, partly because the
plaintiff did not wish to lose the seniority she had earned working else-
where during the two year interim and partly because she did not wish
to be the only woman at the warehouse. 31 3 Ford made a similar offer to
the second plaintiff, who also declined for similar reasons. The EEOC
sued Ford in 1975, alleging violation of Title VII.
1 1 4
The district court and court of appeals held that because Ford had
not offered the claimants retroactive seniority, the offer did not serve to
terminate the accrual of back pay relief."15 The Supreme Court re-
versed the lower court and held that "absent special circumstances," the
rejection of an employer's unconditional job offer tolls the accrual of
back pay liability. 1 16 Retroactive seniority was not required to be in-
cluded with the job offer. The Court emphasized the disruptive effect in
the workplace that the interference with existing seniority would create,
stating that the granting of retroactive seniority benefits would be likely
to cause "deterioration in morale, labor unrest, and reduced
productivity."' 1
7
In addition, the Court noted that requiring retroactive seniority
under section 7 06(g) of Title VII could violate collective bargaining
agreements. 1 8 The Court also considered the large cost that the em-
ployer would be forced to bear if he made offers of retroactive seniority
to each alleged victim, who would then effectively be a newly-hired, in-
experienced worker with advanced seniority rights. 119 Based on all these
factors, the court reasoned that requiring each employer to offer retro-
active seniority to toll backpay liability would eliminate the incentive of
employers to hire Title VII claimants and thereby defeat the Title VII
policy of encouraging voluntary settlement of discrimination dis-
putes. 120 Echoing the victim-oriented remedial approach of Franks and
Teamsters, the Ford Court stated that the primary goal of Title VII is to
get "the victims of employment discrimination into the jobs they de-
serve as quickly as possible."'
2 '
More than in any previous Supreme Court opinion, Ford demon-
strates the Court's unwillingness to disrupt "the established seniority
hierachy."' 12 2 The Court clearly indicated that there are limitations
upon the judicial remedial power as defined in section 7 06(g), particu-
larly when seniority is an element of the remedy or will be affected by
113. Id. at 222.
114. Id. at 223.
115. Id. at 223-24.
116. Id. at 238-39.
117. Id. at 229.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 228-30.
121. Id. at 241.
122. Id.
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III. FIREFIGHTERS LOCAL UNION No. 1784 v. SToTTs
A. Facts
In 1977 Carl Stotts, a black firefighter, filed a class action suit
against the Memphis, Tennessee Fire Department.' 2 4 Stotts alleged
that the fire department's hiring and promotion policies violated Title
123. It is possible to interpret the Ford opinion as being in direct conflict with the
Franks ruling, which allowed awards of retroactive seniority in discrimination cases, and
with the "make-whole" remedial intent of Title VII itself. Several commentators have
done so. See, e.g., Note, Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC: A Setback for Victims of Discrimination, 44
PirrrsBUaGH L. REV. 707 (1983); Note, Ford's Got a Better Idea: How to Toll Backpay Liability to
Title VII Claimants: Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 4 BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 311 (1983).
The Ford opinion, however, eliminates only the requirement that an employee offer a
retroactive seniority award in order to toll backpay liability. The Title VII claimant, in
accepting the unconditional job offer, does not compromise his right to continue pursuing
his claims against the employer for the underlying act of discrimination. Backpay and ret-
roactive seniority are still available as remedies should he prove successful in the suit.
Ford, 458 U.S. at 232 n.18, 237-38; see Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747
(1976); Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
124. 104 S. Ct. at 2581. The Sixth Circuit opinion statistically demonstrates the dis-
criminatory hiring practices of the Memphis Fire Department:
Between 1950 and 1976, the Memphis Fire Department hired
94 black and 1683 white firemen. Promotions within the Fire














Investigator - Lieutenant 0 6
Captain 0 2
1973 Black White
Investigator - Captain 0 5
Captain 0 3








In 1979, blacks constituted between 33 and 37 percent of the
Memphis population. However, the Fire Department was only 10
percent black. The past hiring and promotional policies of the City
of Memphis caused the Fire Department to exhibit the following
racial characteristics in 1979:
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VII, as well as 42 U.S.C. §§ 1980 and 1983.125 The district court con-
solidated the suit with a claim filed against the fire department by Fred
Jones, a black fireman who alleged that he had been denied a promotion
by the department solely on the basis of race. 126 In 1980, the city set-
tled the lawsuit and entered into a consent decree with the claimants to
remedy the department's hiring and promotion practices. The decree
established a hiring goal stating that qualified minorities should fill at
least 50% of all new vacancies as they became available and a promo-
tional goal indicating that qualified minorities should receive at least
20% of all promotions. 12 7 The District Court for the Western District
of Tennessee retained jurisdiction to enter further orders that might be
necessary to effect the purpose of the decree.128 The decree contained
no provisions governing lay offs or demotions.
In early May, 1981, the city announced that projected budget defi-
cits required personnel reduction in all divisions of the city government.
The layoffs were to be based upon a last-hired, first-fired basis, deter-
mined by the individual's city-wide union seniority.129 On May 4, 1981,
the plaintiffs obtained a temporary restraining order preventing the city
from laying off or demoting any minority employee in the Memphis Fire
Department. The following day the parties agreed to the intervention of
the firefighters union in the case.
1 30
At the evidentiary hearing held to consider the plaintiffs request for
a preliminary injunction, the district court determined that nearly 60%
VIII. FIRE FIGHTING
Fire Private I 0 (13) 7 (31)
Fire Private II 100 (71) 594 (504)
Driver 8 (15) 281 (296)
Lieutenant 2 (29) 215 (211)
Captain 1 (2) 73 (82)
Air Crash Chief 0 1
District Chief 0 20
Deputy Chief 0 4
Total 111 1195
IX. AMBULANCE SERVICE
Emergency Unit Operator 7 82
Emergency Unit Lieutenant 0 6
District Chief 0 1
Total 7 89
(As of May 8, 1981)
679 F.2d 541, 550 n.5 (1982).
125. Section 1981 states that all persons within the United States shall have the same
rights in every state as white citizens. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982). Section 1983 provides a
civil action against any individual depriving another of his constitutional rights under color
of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
126. 104 S. Ct. at 2581.
127. Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d 541, 73-78 app. (6th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104
S. Ct. 2576.
128. Id. at 578 app.
129. 104 S. Ct. at 2581-82. The city's seniority system was incorporated in a memoran-
dum of understanding between the union and the city. The memorandum had been re-
ferred to in an earlier consent decree entered into by the city as a result of an action by the
United States Justice Department against the city in 1974 for discriminatory hiring and
promotion practices. See Stotts, 679 F.2d at 549.
130. 104 S. Ct. at 2582.
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of all fireman affected by demotions and approximately 38% of those
terminated would have been minorities if the layoffs were conducted in
accordance with the seniority provisions.' 3 1 The district court con-
cluded that the execution of the layoff policy specified by the city's sen-
iority plan would have a discriminatory impact on the black firemen.
13 2
The court enjoined the city from applying the layoff policy of the senior-
ity system in a manner that would decrease the percentages of minority
employees in the various fire department job classifications and modi-
fied the consent decree accordingly "to minimize the disruptive effect
that layoffs would have on the efforts to achieve the goals of the
decree."1
3 3
B. The Sixth Circuit Opinion
On appeal by the city and the union, the Sixth Circuit upheld the
district court's modification of the consent decree. After finding that the
decree in its original form was fair and reasonable, and that the district
court had not abused its discretion in approving it,'3 4 the appellate
court set forth two legal justifications for the modification of the 1980
consent decree.' 3 5 First, the court determined that under a contract
theory the city could be held to its obligation to engage in affirmative
action in its hiring and promotion practices. In announcing the pro-
posed layoffs, the city had given notice of its intended anticipatory repu-
diation of the terms and goals of the decree because the layoff policy, if
implemented, would largely destroy the progress made in the affirmative
action program.136 The plaintiffs, as parties to a contract, were entitled
to full performance of its terms, which if strictly applied, would have
compelled the city to retain all of the firemen at great expense.
13 7
Hence, the modification allowed by the district court was merely an eq-
uitable adjustment in contractual terms which allowed the city to pro-
ceed with a modified layoff system more responsive to the original goals
of the decree.
Second, the Sixth Circuit observed that a trial court has continuing
equity jurisdiction "to modify a consent decree upon a showing that
'changed circumstances' have transformed the original decree into an
131. 104 S. Ct. at 2581-82; 679 F.2d at 549. It was anticipated that 15 of an estimated
total of 40 firemen to be laid off would be black. 104 S. Ct. at 2582.
132. 104 S. Ct. at 2582.
133. 679 F.2d at 550-51. Although the district court did not explicitly forbid the city's
seniority system, it forced the city to change its provisions to implement the proposed
layoffs. In theory, the city could have solved its financial problems without laying anyone
off, and left the seniority system layoff provisions intact. One proposal made to avoid
layoffs was the reduction of working hours for all fire department employees. See 104 S.
Ct. at 2602.
134. 679 F.2d at 552-55.
135. A third possible mechanism for modification, relief under FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)
when the decree is void or no longer equitable, was mentioned by the court but not
evaluted because the issue was not clearly presented on appeal. Id. at 562.
136. Id. at 561.
137. Id. at 561-62. The court observed the basic contract principle that economic hard-
ship is not an excuse for nonperformance of a contract.
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instrument of wrong."' 3 8 The court reasoned that the city's un'antici-
pated economic crisis and the resulting disproportionate hardship on
minority fireman justified a revision of the terms of the decree lest its
purpose be frustrated.13 9 Therefore, the district court correctly revised
the decree to prohibit layoffs that would affect minority fireman
disproportionately.
In addressing the city's and union's assertions that the district
court's modification of the decree impermissibly awarded the minority
firemen retroactive seniority in violation of Franks and Teamsters, the
court proferred three theories that allow a consent decree to alter ex-
isting seniority provisions. 140 The settlement theory, supported by
opinions of the Seventh and Tenth Circuits, 14 1 holds that courts
strongly favor settlement of Title VII suits; therefore, it is error to re-
138. Id. at 562-63 (quoting United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 115 (1932)).
The court relied upon Swift & Co. and Brown v. Neeb, 644 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1981) for
authority. Brown involved a similar conflict between a collective bargaining agreement re-
quiring layoffs on the basis of seniority and a consent decree which stipulated the imple-
mentation of an affirmative action program in the hiring of Toledo firemen. As in Stotts,
the agreement was silent with respect to layoffs. The Brown court held that the district
court, when faced with imminent layoffs due to economic conditions, had the authority to
modify the consent decree by proscribing layoffs in accordance with the "last-hired, first
fired provisions" of the seniority agreement. 644 F.2d at 559-60. The Brown opinion did
not rule upon the more important issue of whether § 703(h), with its built-in protection of
seniority, would prevent modification of a bona fide seniority system because Brown was
not brought pursuant to Title VII. Id. at 564.
The Supreme Court plurality opinion did not directly discuss the "changed circum-
stances" rationale applied by the Sixth Circuit. Instead, the Court proceeded directly, and
perhaps incorrectly, to the Title VII issues underlying the consent decree modification. See
infra note 182. However, it is arguable whether the "changed circumstances" approach
was appropriate in this case. Justice Stevens held that the adverse effects the layoffs would
have on the level of minority employment was not a "changed circumstance" because it
was obvious at the time at which the decree was entered into that any necessary layoffs
would have such an effect. 104 S. Ct. at 2595 (Stevens, J., concurring). Furthermore, the
Swift case has been applied strictly by numerous courts in denying requests for modifica-
tion of court ordered decrees and injunctions. See Steinberg, SEC and Other Permanent In-
junctions - Standards for Their Imposition, Modification, and Dissolution, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 27,
46-47 (1980).
139. While the Sixth Circuit was willing to modify the terms of the decree under its
equity theory to prevent undue hardship upon the minority firemen, the court emphati-
cally denied the city the defense of "economic hardship" under the contract rationale.
Compare 679 F.2d at 561 with 679 F.2d at 563. Apparently the Sixth Circuit sees a deviation
from the affirmative action policies of the decree as a breach of contract, in spite of the
absence of specific terms in the decree regarding affirmative action in conducting layoffs
and demotions. A modification of the terms of the decree, however, to prevent the termi-
nation and demotion of a disproportionate number of blacks is not a breach of contract
but a legitimate act of equity, justified by an "unanticipated economic crisis." 679 F.2d at
563. When viewed together, it is evident that the two justifications posed by the Sixth
Circuit for modification of the terms of the decree are in effect one. The decree is not
actually treated as a contract, equally binding upon both parties by the plain meaning of its
terms, but rather as a judicial order intended to benefit minority firemen through affirma-
tive action, and subject to any modification necessary to achieve that goal.
140. See 679 F.2d 564-67. It is interesting to note that the Sixth Circuit never, in any of
its arguments supporting the alteration of existing seniority agreements by consent de-
crees, addresses the fact that the district court's modifications, rather than the 1980 de-
cree, interfered with the city's seniority system. It would seem to be a large step from the
principle that one can bargain away one's own rights to the conclusion that a court can also
do so, yet the Sixth Circuit makes it without explanation.
141. 679 F.2d at 564-66 (citing Airline Stewards and Stewardesses Ass'n, Local 550 v.
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view the facts underlying each party's position before approving a con-
sent decree.! The appellate court must review only the settlement to
determine whether the lower court has abused its discretion in approv-
ing it. 142 The merits of the underlying controversy with respect to the
substantive law of Title VII and the Teamsters and Franks rulings are not
relevant to-a decision which should be made on the basis of the legal
principles regulating judicial review of settlement of agreements.
Second, the Sixth Circuit stated that if the Stotts plaintiffs had
proven their Title VII claims of discriminatory hiring and promotion
practices at trial, rather than entering into the decree before trial, the
district court could have then employed the supremacy clause to over-
ride the conflicting provisions of the seniority system. 143 The court rea-
soned that had plaintiffs allegations been true, the trial court would
have had the power to modify the state seniority system, as the federal
law in Title VII is supreme to the state seniority systems. It follows that
a consent decree, which is "the preferred means of settling an employ-
ment discrimination suit,' 1 4 4 should not decrease the court's power to
order relief by modifying conflicting seniority system provisions. To en-
courage employees to comply with the consent decrees voluntarily, the
trial court has the power to treat the allegations in the complaint as true
and, accordingly, override the seniority system.'
4 5
The third rationale suggested by the Sixth Circuit was based upon
the conclusion that the district court's injunction merely achieved the
same results that the city itself could have accomplished by adopting an
affirmative action program requiring layoffs and demotions to be con-
ducted on a racial basis. 146 The court could see no reason why the dis-
trict court should not be able to impose layoff procedures similar to
those to which the city itself might have legally agreed.
Taken collectively, the elements of the Sixth Circuit's analysis hold
that when the goals of an affirmation action program, as set forth in a
consent decree, conflict with a bona fide seniority system, the courts
should modify the terms of the decree to achieve the goals of the affirm-
ative action plan, even at the expense of the seniority system.
C. The Supreme Court Opinion
1. The Plurality
Justice White delivered the plurality opinion of the Supreme
American Airlines, 573 F.2d 960 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978)); E.E.O.C. v.
Safeway Stores, 611 F.2d 795 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 952 (1980).
142. 679 F.2d at 564-65.
143. Id. at 566. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof. . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land." U.S. CONST. art.
VI, § 2.
144. 679 F.2d.at 566.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 566-67 (citing Sisco v.J.S. Alberici Construction Co., 655 F.2d 146 (8th Cir.
1981)), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 976 (1982). Sisco involved the modification of a collective
bargaining agreement by the employer rather than by court order.
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Court. 1 4 7 Joined by the concurrences ofJustices O'ConnorI 4 8 and Ste-
vens, 149 the plurality reversed the Sixth Circuit. The Court held that the
district court had exceeded its powers by entering the injunction and
thereby requiring non-minority fireman to be laid off in contravention of
the terms of a bone fide seniority system.150 Additionally, by modifying
the consent decree, the district court had acted against the policy of
both sections 703(h) and 7 06(g) of Title VII.
15 1
After disposing of the mootness claim raised by the respondents,'
52
the Court rejected the proposition that the district court's injunction on
the city was an action provided for by the original terms and goals of the
1980 decree. 153 Citing the absence of any specific language in the de-
cree providing for the contingency of layoffs and demotions, the Court
said:
[T]he "scope of a consent decree must be discerned within its
four corners, and not by reference to what might satisfy the
purposes of one of the parties to it". . . Had there been any
intention to depart from the seniority plan in the event of lay-
offs or demotions, it is much more reasonable to believe that
there would have been an express provision to that effect.'
54
The Court began its attack on the heart of the Sixth Circuit holding,
the affirmation of the consent decree modification, by citing Teamsters for
147. 104 S. Ct. 2576, 2581 (1984).
148. Id. at 2590.
149. Id. at 2594.
150. Id. at 2590.
151. Id. at 2588-89.
152. The Court found that the dispute between the parties remained alive because the
district court injunction was never vacated and would therefore still apply to any future
layoffs by the fire department. Furthermore, the consent decree as modified would have a
continued impact on the operation of the seniority system and the fire department's settle-
ment of backpay and retroactive seniority claims entered by terminated or demoted non-
minority firemen. 104 S. Ct. at 2583-84. Said the Court, "Respondents cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of a federal court to obtain a favorable modification of a consent decree and
then insulate that ruling from appellate review by claiming that they are no longer inter-
ested in the matter, particularly when the modification continues to have adverse effects on
the other parties to the action." Id. at 2585.
153. Id. at 2585. Although the Supreme Court attributes the Sixth Circuit with holding
that the district court's injunction merely enforced the terms of the decree, the Sixth Cir-
cuit did not directly apply the specific terms of the decree. Instead, the Sixth Circuit
looked to the remedial goals of the decree. 679 F.2d at 559. The decree provided that its
purpose was:
to remedy the past hiring and promotion practices of the Memphis Fire Depart-
ment with respect to the employment of blacks . . . [Tihe parties agree that the
long term goal established in this decree shall be. . . to raise the black represen-
tation in each job classification . . . to levels approximating the black proportion
of the civilian labor force in Shelby County . . .
The Court retains jurisdiction of this action for such further orders as may be
necessary or appropriate to effectuate the purposes of the decree.
679 F.2d at 575-76, 578 app. In contrast, the Supreme Court looked to the specific reme-
dial provisions of the decree and, finding no provisions for layoffs or demotions, held that
the parties would have expressly provided for any remedy as drastic as reworking the city's
seniority system. 104 S. Ct. at 2586. The decree contained specific remedies, 679 F.2d at
576-78 app., and the parties waived their rights to any relief beyond the decree. Id. at 574
app.
154. 104 S. Ct. at 2586 (quoting United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 682
(1971)).
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the principle that "[slection 703(h) . . . permits the routine application
of a seniority system absent proof of an intention to discriminate."'' 55
Observing that the district court found no intent to discriminate on the
basis of race, the Court found that the lower court's injunction modify-
ing the decree, and consequently the seniority system, was improper.
The Court rejected each of the Sixth Circuit's three justifications for
alteration of existing seniority systems. First, the settlement theory
15 6
was discarded because the decree could not be read to be a settlement
on the disputed issues. Nowhere in the decree were the retroactive sen-
iority awards or departure from the specific terms of the seniority system
discussed. 1
57
The second justification was found to be faulty because its underly-
ing premise was a misstatement of the district court's authority. The
Sixth Circuit had reasoned that the district court could override discrim-
inatory aspects of the seniority system by assuming that the firemen had
proved their allegations of discriminatory hiring and promotional prac-
tices. 158 The Supreme Court disagreed. "Title VII precludes a district
court from displacing a non-minority employee with seniority under [a]
contractually established seniority system absent either a finding that the
seniority system was adopted with discriminatory intent or a determina-
tion that such a remedy [is] necessary to make whole a proven victim of
discrimination."1 5 9
The Court also criticized the Sixth Circuit for awarding relief to
people not identified as specific victims. "Mere membership in the dis-
advantaged class is insufficient to warrant a seniority award."' 60 There
had been no finding by the district court that any of the individual plain-
tiffs had been actual victims of illegal discrimination, nor had there been
a finding of discriminatory intent. Therefore, under Teamsters and
Franks, retroactive seniority was not available as a remedy. 161 The Court
stated that the purpose of section 7 06(g) of Title VII is to make victims
of racial discrimination whole. Court ordered quotas, a form of class
based relief rather than victim-specific relief, benefit individuals who
have not shown that they were specific victims of discrimination; there-
fore, quotas are not within the legislative intent of Title VII.'
6 2
155. 104 S. Ct. at 2587.
156. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
157. 104 S. Ct. at 2587-88.
158. See supra notes 143-145 and accompanying text.
159. i04 S. Ct. at 2587 n.9.
160. Id. at 2588 (citing Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 367-71).
161. The lower court's modification of the consent decree was effectively an award of
retroactive seniority. Black firemen with lower seniority rank were to remain employed
while senior non-minority firemen were laid off. Although the fire department did not
actually revise the seniority list to reflect a new seniority order, the consent decree modifi-
cation operated as if it had. 679 F.2d at 551.
162. 104 S. Ct. at 2588-90. The Court did not rule upon the final Sixth Circuit ration-
ale for modification of the decree. Whether the city itself could have voluntarily altered
the seniority system by adopting race conscious layoff and demotion practices was irrele-
vant because the city had not in fact attempted such action. 104 S. Ct. at 2490. See supra
note 146.
[Vol. 62:2
SENIORITY SYSTEMS AND TITLE VII
2. The Concurrences
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion supported the Title VII
analysis of the plurality. Beginning with the principle that bona fide sen-
iority systems are protected by Title VII, 16 3 the opinion reiterated the
Teamsters requirement that only identified victims of unlawful discrimina-
tion are entitled to a remedy. 16 4 The firemen had entered into a con-
sent decree with the city without establishing either discriminatory
animus or the identity of any specific victims of discrimination. The
Supreme Court was simply "holding [the] respondents to the bargain
they struck during the consent decree negotiations in 1980," reasoned
Justice O'Connor. 16 5 To award relief to firemen not specifically identi-
fied as victims, or to allow the respondents to identify victims after en-
tering into the decree, would undermine the Title VII policy of
encouraging voluntary settlement of employment discrimination
cases.1 6 6 Justice O'Connor agreed that the district court's preliminary
injunction was beyond the bounds of the court's authority and therefore
an abuse of discretion.
Justice Steven's concurrence was based strictly upon the procedural
issues surrounding the interpretation and modification of a consent de-
cree. He wrote that "the Court's discussion of Title VII is wholly advi-
sory . . . . If the consent decree justified the District Court's
preliminary injunction, then that injunction should be upheld irrespec-
tive of whether Title VII would authorize a similar injunction."' 16 7 Jus-
tice Stevens found that the District Court had not explained how its
injunction could be based on a reasonable interpretation of the decree.
Nor could modification of the decree be justified due to changed circum-
stances, as suggested by the district court, because the adverse effect on
black employment that the proposed layoffs were expected to cause
could have been anticipated at the time of the formation of the de-
cree. 16 8 Therefore Justice Stevens agreed with the Court's conclusion




The dissenting opinion, written by justice Blackmun, joined by jus-
tices Brennan and Marshall, agreed with Justice Stevens that the Stotts
case should not have been decided on the basis of Title VII issues for
two reasons. First, the dissent held that the Stotts case was moot because
the 1981 consent decree modification applied only to the 1981 layoffs
and not to any future layoffs.17 0 Second, the dissent held that the plu-
163. Id. at 2592 (citing American Tobacco, 456 U.S. at 65 and Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 352).
164. 104 S. Ct. at 2593 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 2593-94.
167. Id. at 2594.
168. Id. at 2595. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 2596, 2597 (Blackman, J., dissenting). See infra note 182.
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rality had not applied the correct standard of review to the preliminary
injunction issued by the District Court. 17 1 The dissent felt that by re-
viewing the merits of the underlying legal claim, that is whether the pro-
posed layoffs violated the consent decree, the plurality had treated the
case as if a permanent injunction rather than a preliminary injunction
had been involved. "The question before a reviewing court 'is simply
whether the issuance of the [preliminary] injunction, in light of the ap-
plicable standard, constituted an abuse of discretion.' "172
IV. ANALYSIS
A. An Issue of Procedure
Stotts presents the Supreme Court with the recurring conflict be-
tween the socially important Title VII goals and the preciously guarded
seniority rights of incumbent employees. As we have seen, the Supreme
Court has struggled with this problem from the first instance in which
the operation of Title VII began to impinge on seniority rights. Both
the operation of seniority systems and the use of seniority as a remedy
have been at issue. The debate has been vociferous, its life prolonged in
part by the ambiguity of Title VII's legislative history on the amount of
protection seniority systems are to be afforded, and in part due to the
vitality of the interests at stake. Because the Supreme Court plurality
has chosen to decide Stotts in terms of this issue, the opinion will inevita-
bly be one of social import. Stotts will be closely read for its potential
ramifications upon the debate, of which there are several.
But Stotts is more than a renewed opportunity to re-examine in rela-
tive simplicity the seniority-affirmative action problem. Undeniably in-
tertwined, and the over-riding issue from the legal if not social
perspective, is the issue of consent decree interpretation and modifica-
tion. Therefore, the first evidence of the significance of Stotts may be
gleaned from the large extent to which the Supreme Court relied upon
and discussed Title VII policy and case law in a case which could have
been decided strictly in terms of federal procedure.
The Sixth Circuit analyzed Stotts almost entirely as a procedural
problem. It applied the law of the operation and modification of con-
sent decrees to the facts, and found the lower court's actions to be
within the law of procedure. 173 The Sixth Circuit quickly disposed of
the Franks and Teamsters defenses, relying instead on procedural argu-
ments, 174 and never delved into the substantive law underlying the con-
sent decree.
Similarly, four of the nine Supreme Court justices believed that
171. Id. at 2600 (Blackman, J., dissenting). See supra note 13 1-33 and accompanying
text (discussing the preliminary injunction requested by the plaintiffs).
172. 104 S. Ct. at 2600 (quoting Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975)).
173. See supra notes 134-44 and accompanying text.
174. Id. Only in its third argument did the Sixth Circuit comment upon the appropri-
ateness of layoffs by seniority with respect to Title VII. 679 F.2d at 566-67. See supra note
146 and accompanying text.
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Stotts was a procedural case and not a Title VII case.17 5 AsJustice Black-
mun suggested, the plurality gave the wrong answer to what was proba-
bly the wrong question. 176 Justice Stevens wrote that "the Court's
discussion of Title VII is wholly advisory,"' 17 7 as he observed that sec-
tions 703(h) and 706(g) place no limitations whatsoever on what parties
can do in a consent decree.178 Other courts have found that the terms
of consent decrees and state agency orders, rather than the policies of
Title VII, govern disputes over the application of the orders and decrees
in Title VII cases. 179 In fact, the plurality itself effectively reversed the
Sixth Circuit opinion based on a strictly procedural analysis. It held that
a consent decree should be interpreted within its four corners and there-
fore, inasmuch as the decree did not mention abandonment or altera-
tion of the seniority system, the seniority system should not be
abandoned or altered to construct a remedy for unlawful discrimina-
tion.' 8 0 It is not obvious from the opinion why the plurality felt com-
pelled to compound this satisfactory holding with discussion and
application of the Title VII issue. 18 1 The lack of necessity for the discus-
175. See 104 S. Ct. at 2594 (Stevens J., concurring) and 104 S. Ct. at 2605 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 2605 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 2594 (Stevens, J., concurring).
178. Id. at 2594 n.3; accord id. at 2605 n.9 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
179. See, e.g., Grann v. City of Madison, 738 F.2d 786 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
296 (1984) (holding "reliance on a state agency's order enforcing the right of a protected
group to be free from discrimination in employment is an absolute bar to suits by fellow
employees claiming that the action required by the remedial order constitutes a violation
of Title VII" Id. at 794.); EEOC v. McCall Printing Corp., 633 F.2d 1232 (6th Cir. 1980)
(agreeing that blacks may be hurt by a consent decree awarding women retroactive senior-
ity which gave them status superior to the blacks who entered an earlier decree without
seniority, but denying black's claim because a "consent decree cannot form the basis of a
valid Title VII action in this case" Id. at 1237 quoted in Grann, 738 F.2d at 794.); Dennison
v. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water and Power, 658 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1981) (non-
minority employee challenge to a consent decree establishing an affirmative action plan
was rejected in part because the consent decree "is not subject to collateral attack." Id. at
695, cited in Grann, 738 F.2d at 794).
180. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. at 2586. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
181. Justice White suggests in a footnote that the "posture" in which the case came to
the Supreme Court required a Title VII analysis. 104 S. Ct. at 2587 n.9. As mentioned
above, however, the Sixth Circuit's "posture" was essentially one of procedure. See supra
notes 134-44 and accompanying text.
The footnote contains a second, and equally unconvincing, rationale for deciding the
case in terms of Title VII. The Court observed that a change in the law which brings a
consent decree into conflict with the statute pursuant to which the decree was entered is a
change of circumstances sufficient to allow a modification of the decree.(citing System
Fed'n No. 91, Ry. Employee's Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642 (1961). The rule
of law that changed circumstances may justify the modification of a consent decree is well-
settled. See U.S. v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932); see generally Comment, Requests by
the Government for Modification of Consent Decrees, 75 YALE L. J. 657 (1966). The Court then
proposed that if a change in law is reason to modify a newly conflicting decree, then there
can be no modification of a decree which would result in a conflict with existing law. 104
S. Ct. at 2587 n.9. The Court therefore reasoned that because the modification would
violate Title VII, it was improper. This is a clever turn of logic, which obviously serves the
Court's purpose in bringing the Title VII issues into the decision, but it has no clear sup-
port in the law. As the dissent pointed out, it is by no means certain "that a consent decree
cannot provide relief that could not be obtained at trial." Id. at 2605 n.9 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). Additionally, by interjecting the Title VII substantive law into its review of the
consent decree modification, which was in fact a preliminary injunction entered by the
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sion suggests that the Court was eager to rule once again upon the Title
VII issue. This eagerness serves to amplify the import of the Court's
Title VII analysis, whatever the content may itself suggest.'
8 2
B. Interpreting the Significance of Stotts
Section 703(h) was enacted to protect seniority systems.' 8 3 Section
706(g) was enacted to define the limitations of judicial remedial
power. 18 4 Through the course of several decisions interpreting both of
these sections as they apply to Title VII's overall purpose of eliminating
discrimination in the workplace, the Court has erected the twin pillars of
intent and the victim's proof of harm.' 8 5 The two requirements are
highly favorable toward bona fide seniority systems. Nonetheless, they
have been in place since the American Tobacco and Teamsters decisions.
18 6
The Stotts holding on its face does not modify this precedent as it
applies sections 703(h) and 706(g). Justice White reiterated that absent
proof of intent to discriminate, the routine application of a seniority sys-
tem is permissible. 187 Similarly, the opinion repeated the requirement
that claimants show themselves to be victims before they are entitled to
the remedy of retroactive seniority. t 88 Justice O'Connor echoed both
requirements. ' 89
The narrow interpretation of the Stotts holding is that where parties
enter into a consent decree to implement affirmative action policies;
where the defendant's seniority system is bona fide and has no discrimi-
natory animus;190 where the plaintiff is not a proven victim of the under-
lying discrimination; 19 1 and where the decree does not set forth the
procedure with which layoffs, if necessary, are to be executed; the lower
court may not modify the decree to limit the detrimental effect of the
layoffs on the minorities benefitted by the decree at the expense of bona
fide seniority rights of incumbent non-minority employees. At its nar-
district court, the Court did not utilize the requisite, less probing, "abuse of discretion"
standard of review. Id. at 2600 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing University of Texas v.
Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 392 (1981)).
182. The Court was also forced to leap the mootness hurdle before getting to the Title
VII issues. See supra note 152. Although the majority's mootness arguments were not as
strained as the efforts to go beyond the procedural ruling, the plurality and concurring
opinions each addressed the mootness defense in some depth. See 104 S. Ct. at 2583-85;
Id. at 2591-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Id. at 2594 & n.2, (Stevens J., concurring). The
dissent persuasively argued that because the city had rehired every worker who had been
laid off pursuant to the modified plan, the "adverse relationship between the opposing
parties . . . is gone." Id. at 2596 (Blackman, J., dissenting).
183. See supra notes 12-75 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 76-123 and accompanying text.
185. American Tobacco, 456 U.S. at 65; Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 371. See supra note 66.
186. American Tobacco, 456 U.S. at 65; Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 371.
187. 104 S. Ct. at 2587 (citing Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 352). As discussed above, the
intent requirement was not clearly stated until the American Tobacco decision. See American
Tobacco, 456 U.S. at 65; supra note 66 and accompanying text.
188. 104 S. Ct. at 2588-89 (citing Teamsters).
189. Id. at 2592-93. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 2587.
191. Since Stotts never went to trial, he never proved that he was victimized by the fire
department's discrimination. See Id. at 2588.
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rowest, Stotts reiterates prior case law and bars the interpolation of af-
firmative action layoff terms into consent decrees in which those terms
do not exist.
Stating the Stotts holding in this manner raises the question of
whether the outcome of the case would have been different if the con-
sent decree's affirmative action provisions had been made applicable
specifically to layoffs. The Court deliberately avoided answering this
question. 19 2 The Court, however, ruled in WR. Grace & Co. v. Local
Union 759,193 that where an employer's Title VII conciliation agreement
protecting its female employees conflicted with the seniority rights of
the male employees, the male employees were entitled to an award for
being laid off in contradiction of their seniority rights. The court rea-
soned that if an employer enters into two conflicting contractual obliga-
tions, he will be liable when he is forced to breach the terms of one of
the agreements.19 4 The rationale of this opinion suggests that a consent
decree could contain layoff terms that contradict the seniority system
provisions, but if the employer then lays off minority employees in order
to respect the seniority rights of the non-minorities, he would be liable
to the minorities. It would therefore be incorrect to interpret Stotts as
indicating that employers may violate express affirmative action layoff
provisions that conflict with a bona fide seniority system without incur-
ring liability. The Stotts opinion contains a strong pro-seniority posture
but does not limit the employer's ability to expressly agree to affirmative
action layoff policies that contravene its own seniority system.
There are, however, two aspects of the Stotts opinion that may indi-
cate to future courts that new limitations have been placed upon the
effectiveness of Title VII. The first is the strong emphasis upon victim-
specific remedial policies and the clear rejection of court-ordered racial
quotas.19 5 Voluntary, private quotas and race-conscious remedies have
been approved by the Supreme Court, 19 6 but the clear denunciation of
the use of quotas for remedial purposes in Title VII cases may be an
abandonment by the Supreme Court of other private or court-ordered
quota systems. Furthermore, the victim-specific emphasis may serve to
discourage class action settlement in Title VII cases because each claim-
ant may elect to await a judicial decree declaring himself an actual victim
of discrimination, thereby availing himself of possible reinstatement,
backpay, and retroactive seniority remedies.
The second aspect of Stotts which may indicate an increasingly pro-
seniority tenor to Title VII opinions is the characterization of the Ford
192. Id. at 2590.
193. 103 S. Ct. 2177 (1983).
194. Id. at 2184. The seniority rights stemmed from the collective bargaining agree-
ment which provided for arbitration of disputes. The Court heard the case on an appeal of
an arbitrator's award, and could only overturn the agreement if it violated public policy or
if the decision failed to "draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreements." (ci-
tations omitted). Id. at 2183.
195. 104 S. Ct. at 2589-90.
196. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (holding that voluntary, pri-
vate, race-conscious affirmative action is not prohibited by Title VII):
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ruling as standing for the proposition that seniority is only to be
awarded after balancing all of the equities. 19 7 The Ford case dealt with
the limited issue of whether seniority should be a part of the offer to
alleged discrimination victims required to toll backpay liability. 19 8 Ret-
roactive seniority as a remedy for proven victims of discrimination, as
allowed in Franks,19 9 was not at issue in Ford. Once a victim proved his
discrimination claim, retroactive seniority could become an element of
his remedy without requiring the court to first balance the competing
interests of the incumbent employees and the victim. 20 0 But the Stotts
summary of the Ford holding fails to distinguish seniority as an element
of an offer to toll backpay liability from the general use of seniority as a
remedy. Therefore, the Stotts Court seemingly broadens the applicabil-
ity of the Ford requirement that the equities be balanced before an award
of seniority can be made; hence, it increases the protection afforded
bona fide seniority systems. Stotts confirms the Court's heightened sen-
sitivity to any interference with seniority systems.
20 '
In summary, the bare holding of Stotts, on the relatively narrow is-
sue presented in the case, is not a dramatic one. No new law was created
regarding the fundamental seniority-affirmative action conflict except
the rule that incomplete consent decrees cannot be re-written to violate
existing Title VII policies. The true significance of Stotts will remain
unknown until future courts interpret the opinion. The possible shifting
of posture of the Supreme Court as indicated above, and the Court's
eagerness to rule on Title VII issues, may suggest significant change to
some courts and provoke rulings antagonistic toward Title VII discrimi-
nation claimants. 20 2 The significance of Stotts can be curtailed easily by
limiting it closely to its facts. It is possible that courts seeking to bolster
affirmative action policies and courts seeking to protect seniority sys-
tems will both find application for the Stotts opinion.
Lawrence K. Hoyt*
197. 104 S. Ct. at 2588; Id. at 2593 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
198. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
199. 424 U.S. at 762-70. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
200. 104 S. Ct. at 2593 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
201. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
202. The Tenth Circuit has already referred to Stotts as an acknowledgement by the
Supreme Court that earlier Title VII holdings must be modified to "more clearly reflect
the letter and intent of Title VII." Carlile v. South Routt School Dist. RD-35, 739 F.2d
1496, 1500 (10th Cir. 1984) (female teacher failed to establish a prima facia case that she
was denied tenure for discriminatory reasons). In contrast, the Sixth Circuit of Appeals, in
a decision rejecting a non-minority challenge to a voluntary affirmative action hiring pro-
gram, denied that the Stotts opinion had any bearing on its case because Stotts involved a
court-ordered plan rather than a voluntary plan. Van Aken v. Young, No. 82-1570, slip
op. at 3 (6th Cir. December 13, 1984).
* The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Terence M. Ridley in writ-
ing and researching sections I and II of this article.
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